Part 5 of Defense at Machine Speed: Make the Attacker Pay.
Defense so far accepted the attacker's economics. The harness runs cheap and tireless; you out-scan and out-fix it.
Second lever: make the attack expensive, slow, and loud.
1/ An agentic attacker burns compute per target: tokens to plan, tokens per tool call, time per attempt. Multiply the cost of an attempt and you compress its core advantage.
Double the cost per real finding and you have halved the attacking fleet. No patch required.
2/ The public shape: OrcaRouter's Shield, deception built for offensive AI agents. Fake endpoints, decoy credentials, synthetic mazes, escalating to blocks.
Company-reported: 87% of agent traffic diverted, attacker tokens up 2.3x, time up 5x. No published methodology. Read it as company-reported.
3/ The honest detail, from the company itself: ARTEX flagged the honeypot at minute six.
That is not failure. Six minutes and a pile of tokens is the tax, and the attempt is telemetry. Deception at machine speed is not a wall. It is a toll, charged in the currency the attacker spends.
4/ Decoys are also tripwires. A decoy credential has no legitimate user, so any use is a high-fidelity alarm. And a thorough harness cannot avoid touching decoys: its greatest strength, probing everything, becomes the mechanism of its detection.
5/ The other lever is unglamorous: kill identity chaining. Cloudflare's incident analysis says orchestrators mostly walk in on static, broad CI/CD tokens, hopping system to system on legitimate authority.
Short-lived, narrow scopes. A stolen secret should buy minutes and one room, not months and the building.
Full piece on Substack.